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Non-technical summary
This study provides new stylized facts on the determinants of corporate acquisition and
failure in Germany. In that course, it has important implications for the design of empirical
studies. In particular, we identify which firm-specific characteristics are helpful to explain
corporate acquisition and failure, and which measures of these characteristics have the
highest explanatory power. We also examine to what extent the length of the forward-
looking time horizon affects the usefulness of our explanatory variables. But we do not
examine these issues in a multivariate framework.
The analysis is based on a sample of about 1,700 medium-sized and large German firms
for the years 1986-1995. We include listed as well as non-listed firms. Evidence based on
descriptive statistics identifies specific firm characteristics that are useful to explain acqui-
sition and failure. Among these are performance, capital structure, ownership concentra-
tion, ownership complexity, restructuring activity, and firm size. In addition, information
on the type of the ultimately controlling shareholder turns out to be important.
This study has important implications for the design of empirical studies explaining cor-
porate failure or acquisition. First, failure and acquisition typically are the two main
reasons for sample attrition in empirical studies, and they appear to be influenced by
common factors. Hence, they should be examined in combination. Second, we find that
the industry distribution is significantly different for failure and acquisitions. This calls
for some kind of industry adjustment in the empirical analysis, for example by including
industry dummies or by correcting some variables for their industry benchmark. Third, a
range of firm-specific characteristics is helpful to explain failure and acquisition. Analyses
leaving out some of these measures are potentially subject to the classical omitted varia-
bles problem. Fourth, care should be taken when selecting specific measures for these firm
characteristics because some measures perform much better than others in the analysis
of firm exit. Finally, the good news is that the length of the forward-looking time horizon
essentially does not seem to matter for the usefulness of our measures. This implies that
regression models using short lags should capture the main effects.
1 Introduction
The determinants of corporate acquisition and failure have recently attracted the in-
creased attention of researchers and policy-makers alike. In Germany, but also in other
Continental European countries the number of insolvencies continued to rise or stagnated
at high levels. At the same time, in the past decade we have seen an upsurge in merger
and acquisitions activity, both within and across the borders. In Germany and in other
Continental European countries, hostile takeovers are rare (Franks and Mayer, 1998). But
similarly to the US, registered block trades occur more frequently than tender offers (see
Barcley and Holderness, 1991, and Bethel et al., 1998, for the US; see Franks and Mayer,
1994, and Ko¨ke, 2000, for Germany; see Renneboog, 2000, for Belgium). In Germany,
the repeal of the corporate capital gains tax on sales of cross-shareholdings, coming into
effect in the year 2002, is expected to stimulate the market for large share blocks even
further. However, especially German policy-makers often argue that acquisitions occur to
the detriment of shareholders and other stakeholders. A recent example is the takeover of
Mannesmann by the British telecom company Vodafone that provoked intense discussions
on the merits of acquisitions.
The intention of this study is to provide new stylized facts on the determinants of cor-
porate acquisition and failure in medium-sized and large German firms. This is important
for several reasons. First, previous empirical studies for Germany focus on small firms
(e.g., Wagner, 1999; Almus, 2000). Second, most previous empirical studies for Germa-
ny (e.g., Harhoff et al., 1998), but also for other countries (e.g., Altman, 1968) do not
examine failure and acquisition in combination, although both can be regarded as two
forms of market exit. Third, previous research typically concentrates on performance, fi-
nancial pressure, and firm size as determinants of acquisition and failure (e.g., Powell,
1997; Bethel et al., 1998). We extend this list by considering corporate restructuring as
well as detailed ownership characteristics, for example the type of the ultimate owner or
ownership complexity. Fourth, we know very little about how these different firm-specific
characteristics are best to be measured. Therefore, we investigate a range of variables for
each characteristic. Finally, in contrast to standard bankruptcy and merger models we do
not only focus on the year prior to exit because this would introduce a selection bias, as
argued by Shumway (2001). Rather, we examine different forward-looking time horizons,
ranging from one year to four or more years, to see to what extent results in a multivariate
framework are likely to depend on the length of this time horizon.
Besides offering a number of stylized facts on corporate acquisition and failure in Ger-
many, this study also serves as a guideline for future empirical research. We explicitly
point out which variables are likely to be useful and which time horizon to consider in
studies of acquisition and failure. Therefore, the analysis is kept simple and uses descrip-
tive statistics only. For a first application of our findings in a multivariate framework see
Heiss and Ko¨ke (2001).
The analysis is based on a sample of almost 1,700 medium-sized and large listed as well
as non-listed German companies for the years 1986-1995. As firm characteristics helpful to
explain failure we identify accounting performance (measured as industry-adjusted return-
on-assets or total factor productivity), financial pressure (debt-to-assets ratio), firm size
(total assets), layoff activity (growth rate of employment), as well as concentration and
complexity of ownership. For acquisitions, the same characteristics are useful, with the
exception of layoffs and membership in pyramids as one measure of ownership complexi-
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ty. We also find that information on the type of the ultimately controlling shareholder is
likely to be related to the incidence of acquisition and failure. Regarding the length of the
forward-looking time horizon, we find that typically the differences in firm-specific cha-
racteristics between surviving, failing, and acquired firms persist, irrespective whether the
time horizon is one year or up to four or more years. Hence, the usefulness of explanatory
variables does not vary much with the length of the time horizon.
We proceed as follows. Section 2 provides a short overview to the theoretical and empi-
rical literature on the determinants of acquisition and failure. The literature is condensed
into a set of hypotheses to guide the descriptive analysis in Section 4. Section 3 descri-
bes the data used in this study. Section 4 compares the industry distribution of firms
that fail or are acquired, and it compares these firms with surviving firms on important
firm-specific characteristics. Section 5 summarizes the main findings, formulates new sty-
lized facts on acquisition and failure, and concludes with some lessons for the design of
empirical studies.
2 Hypotheses
To guide our search for firm-specific characteristics that determine acquisition and failure,
we formulate a set of hypotheses building on the theoretical and empirical literature. The
first set of hypotheses concentrates on factors that make failure and acquisition more likely
to occur. These are poor performance and high financial pressure, but also restructuring
activity as an indicator of the ongoing need to adapt operations.
Hypothesis A1: Acquisitions are more likely for firms with poor performance.
Hypothesis F1: Failures are more likely for firms with poor performance.
Hypothesis A2: Acquisitions are more likely for firms with high financial pressure.
Hypothesis F2: Failures are more likely for firms with high financial pressure.
Hypothesis A3: Acquisitions are more likely for firms that undergo severe restructuring.
Hypothesis F3: Failures are more likely for firms that undergo severe restructuring.
The current theoretical view of control transfers is largely shaped by two conflicting ef-
fects of blockholder control (Kahan, 1993; Bebchuk, 1994). On the one hand, transferring
control to a more effective management team could improve efficiency. On the other hand,
the acquirer’s primary motive may be to loot the firm to the detriment of small share-
holders. Empirical evidence suggests that block trades lead to efficiency gains (Barcley
and Holderness, 1991). Similarly, evidence on the aftermath of block purchases suggests
that they bring about improvements. For the US, Bethel et al. (1998) report that activist
block purchases are followed by significant operational changes, increased CEO turnover,
and improvements in profitability. For the UK, Franks et al. (1999) document increased
board turnover in poorly performing firms after a block purchase. For Germany, Ko¨ke
(2000) finds that control transfers are followed by increased managerial turnover as well
as improvements in profitability and productivity of poorly performing firms. Denis and
Sarin (1999) and Maksimovic and Phillips (2000) provide empirical evidence for the US
that firms with poor performance are more likely to be takeover targets. In summary, we
expect poor performance to be related to a higher probability of takeover (Hypothesis
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A1). Concerning firm failure, a number of studies suggests that performance is useful to
explain firm failure (see, e.g., Altman, 1968; Powell, 1997; Astebro and Winter, 2001). In
short, we expect that firms are more likely to fail when performance is poor (Hypothesis
F1).
Related to performance is the capital structure as a determinant of firm failure or
changes in ownership. Mitchell and Mulherin (1996) argue that economic shocks to an
industry can alter the allocation of resources within the firm. In turn, changes in the
firm’s growth opportunities, leverage, or firm size could make adjustments in ownership
necessary. Consistent with this view, Zingales (1998) reports that following deregulation
in the US trucking industry in 1977 firms were confronted with increasing leverage, and
that this has lead to a higher probability of market exit. Other empirical studies on firm
failure confirm this role of financial pressure (Altman, 1968; Powell, 1997). Hence, we
expect that firms with higher financial pressure are more likely to be takeover targets or
candidates for failure (Hypotheses A2 and F2).
Restructuring activity could also explain firm failure. If a firm starts a restructuring
program, for example by laying off employees or selling assets after financial difficulties
became obvious, then restructuring could serve as an indicator that the firm firm has
been or still is in the need of reorganization. Almus (2000) provides evidence for small
German firms that failing firms show stagnation or reductions in employment already
several years before final failure. Hence, ongoing restructuring activity could represent
either first indicators of failure (Hypothesis F3) or difficulties that need to be resolved by
a new owner of the distressed firm (Hypothesis A3).
The second set of hypotheses concentrates on factors that make failure or acquisition
less likely to occur. These encompass ownership concentration, ownership complexity, and
firms size.
Hypothesis A4: Acquisitions are less likely for firms with very high and very low
concentration of ownership.
Hypothesis F4: Failures are less likely for firms with high concentration of ownership.
Hypothesis A5: Acquisitions are less likely for firms with complex ownership structures.
Hypothesis F5: Failures are less likely for firms with complex ownership structures.
Hypothesis A6: Acquisitions are less likely for large firms.
Hypothesis F6: Failures are less likely for large firms.
Concentration of share ownership could affect the likelihood of firm failure or control
transfer. Grossman and Hart (1980) argue that a precondition for hostile takeovers to be
effective is concentrated share ownership because under a dispersed ownership structure
shareholders would prefer to free-ride. In consequence, no takeover would take place in
widely held firms. Burkart et al. (2000) show that the incumbent and new controlling
shareholder prefer to trade the block rather than sell shares to the public and, in a second
step, accumulate those dispersed shares because they anticipate the free-riding behavior
of small shareholders in tender offers. Hence, an ex ante larger concentration of shares
should make block transfers more likely. In contrast, Holmstro¨m and Tirole (1993) argue
that takeovers require low concentration of ownership and, in turn, high market liquidity
because only then are capital markets able to determine the necessity of a takeover. The
3
few cases of hostile takeovers in Germany support Holmstro¨m and Tirole: In all cases the
shares of the takeover target were widely dispersed (Franks and Mayer, 1998). However,
the significant number of non-hostile control transfers in Germany indicates that block
trades occur also in the presence of large share concentration, which is typical for German
companies (Ko¨ke, 2000; Jenkinson and Ljungqvist, 2001). In sum, we expect the costs
of a takeover to be the largest for both very high and very low concentration of share
ownership (Hypothesis A4). The implication of share concentration for firm failure is
less ambiguous. Higher share concentration implies that the scope for agency conflicts
is reduced, and hence large shareholders can alleviate the agency problem via better
monitoring (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986). We expect that the likelihood of failure shrinks
with ownership concentration (Hypothesis F4).
As to Hypotheses A5 and F5, the complexity of a firm’s ownership structure can also
be relevant. If a firm is part of a pyramid, management could be more likely to resist
control sales because selling parts of a conglomerate would imply a loss of organizational
capital. Likewise, pyramids can manifest managerial empires and as such have a value to
managers (Franks and Mayer, 1995). We expect that changes in ownership are less likely
when the respective firm is part of a pyramid. Similarly, changes in ownership should be
less likely if a firm is ultimately controlled by the well-known web of German firms (Adams,
1994; Wenger and Kaserer, 1998). The reason is that cross-ownership can provide target
management with an effective anti-takeover device against unwelcome raiders (Bebchuk, et
al. 1998). Likewise, we expect failures to be less likely for firms which are part of pyramids
or are controlled by cross-owned shareholders. The reason is that complex ownership
structures, as represented by pyramids and cross-ownership, could reduce informational
asymmetries. Likewise, empire-building could prevent management from closing down
firms even in mature industries (Jensen, 1986).
Finally, firm size could deter changes in control (Hypothesis A6) and firm failure
(Hypothesis F6). Shleifer and Vishny (1992) argue that the market for corporate control
is less liquid as size increases. Another reason might be that the likelihood of a takeover
will be lower for large firms due to wealth constraints on the side of the buyer. Bethel et
al. (1998) and Mulherin and Boone (2000) provide empirical evidence that smaller firms
are more likely to become takeover targets. If firms are very large and if these firms get
into financial trouble, this might give management the opportunity to be eligible for help
from creditors or the government. A recent example is the case of Holzmann AG, a large
German construction conglomerate. After having come into severe financial difficulties,
creditors agreed – under the lead of German chancellor Schro¨der – to extend existing
credits to Holzmann AG by another two billion DM.
3 Data and frequency of exit
The full sample comprises 6,515 observations from 1,670 listed as well as non-listed Ger-
man firms for the years 1986-1995. For all firms the data set contains yearly information
on performance, capital structure, ownership structure, restructuring activity, and firm
size. In addition, it contains information on the industry (two-digit NACE code). The
panel is unbalanced in the sense that firms can enter the sample after the year 1986 and
exit the sample before 1995, the final year of the sample.
A crucial element of the data set is detailed information on the firms’ ownership struc-
ture. Ownership information is available for the years 1986-1996. Applying a concept of
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control, which is based on ultimate share ownership (Ko¨ke, 2000; see Appendix B), we
identify whether a firm in any given year has a dominant shareholder or not. In a second
step, based on changes in the name of the so-defined ultimate owner we determine whe-
ther a new owner acquires control. For the cases in which balance sheet data time series
end before 1996, the last year for which ownership information is available, we evaluate
whether this lack of balance sheet data is due to an acquisition or bankruptcy in the
year ahead. In sum, we obtain information on the survival status (survival, acquisition,
or failure) of all sample firms. Since the last year for which the survival status can be
observed is 1996, and since the present analysis focuses on the years prior to a change in
control or failure, the sample used for the analysis covers the years 1986-1995.
Note that we consider only cases in which a new owner acquires control, either from
the dominant shareholder or from previously dispersed shares. We do not consider cases
in which an initially concentrated control block is dissolved because this study focuses on
true acquisitions of control. Mello and Parsons (1998) argue that the market for dispersed
shareholdings is distinct from the market for control blocks. For empirical evidence that
the market for shares is segmented along this line, see Hanley and Wilhelm (1995).
Table 1: Number of firms by reason and year of exit
Year of sample exit Survival Failure Acquisition Total
1987 0 0 3 3
1988 2 0 19 21
1989 2 0 45 47
1990 3 1 38 42
1991 4 1 22 27
1992 3 3 34 40
1993 10 6 19 35
1994 19 1 52 72
1995 68 16 54 138
1996 1,110 3 132 1,245
Total 1,221 31 418 1,670
In percent 73.1% 1.9% 25.0% 100.0%
Notes: Number of firms that exit the sample in a given year due to failure or acquisition (repor-
ted in columns failure and acquisition, respectively). Firms that leave the sample but survive
(reported in column survival) exit simply due to an interrupted balance sheet data time series.
But only those firms are classified as surviving which do not experience failure or acquisition
within at least one more year. The last year for which information on the survival status was
collected is 1996.
Table 1 shows how many firms exit from the sample in any one year, together with the
reason for exit. In addition, Table 1 provides information in which year the time series of
surviving firms end. Out of 1,670 firms the largest majority (73.1%) survives. For most
surviving firms time series data end in the year 1996. About one hundred surviving firms,
though, have shorter time series, ending the earliest in 1988. A small fraction of firms
(1.9%) declares bankruptcy, and a quarter of firms is acquired by another entity. Most
cases of failure take place in the year 1995. Likewise, the rate of acquisitions is the highest
during the years 1994-1996. One explanation for these high rates of market exit could be
that the German economy went through a major recession in the mid 1990s.
The empirical analysis in Sections 4 is based on a full sample (6,515 firm-years), and
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three sub-samples (Table 2). In the full sample, for each firm-year included it is known
whether the respective firm still exists in the following year (survival), declares bankruptcy
(failure), or is taken over by another entity (acquisition). Hence, the forward-looking time
horizon is one year. In the three sub-samples, the number of observations is reduced
because the forward-looking time horizon is extended to two years (5,331 firm-years),
three years (4,049 firm-years), and four or more years (3,283 firm-years), respectively.
The sub-samples include only those observations for which information on the exit status
is available for the next two, three, and four or more years. Table 2 summarizes the number
of observations used in the empirical analysis, separately for the number of years looking
ahead (time horizon).
Table 2: Number of observations by time horizon
Time horizon Survival Failure Acquisition Total
Within 1 year 6,066 31 418 6,515
Within 2 years 4,605 54 672 5,331
Within 3 years 3,321 75 653 4,049
Within 4 years + 2,228 139 916 3,283
Notes: Number of firms in a given year that survive, fail, or are acquired within the next year,
the next two years, the next three years, or the next for or more years, respectively.
Appendix A contains a detailed description of the data sources used and the procedure
applied to construct the sample. Appendix B gives a technical description of the concept of
control used to identify the ultimate owner of each sample firm. Appendix C summarizes
the definition of all variables analyzed in this study.
4 Stylized facts
In this section, we present detailed descriptive statistics on firm-specific characteristics
which are likely to determine failure and acquisition. Our intention is to identify a set
of variables that are useful for empirical analyses investigating corporate acquisition and
failure. In addition, we check whether the length of the forward-looking time horizon mat-
ters when using the identified firm characteristics as explanatory variables in empirical
analyses. The hypotheses put forward in Section 2 serve as a guideline for the following
analysis. First, we look whether there is significant industry clustering of firms that survi-
ve, fail, or are acquired (Section 4.1). In Sections 4.2-4.5 we present descriptive evidence
on firm-specific characteristics such as performance, capital structure, ownership struc-
ture, restructuring activity, and firm size. And in Section 4.6 we briefly summarize which
measures turn out to be helpful as explanatory variables.
4.1 Industry distribution
Table 3 shows the industry pattern of surviving, failing, and acquired firms, based on the
full sample of 1,670 firms. The largest fraction of sample firms operates in wholesale trade
(12.4 percent), machinery (11.3 percent), chemicals (8.6 percent), and food (7.7 percent).
Industries with a comparatively large fraction of failing firms are textiles, clothing,
machinery, construction of other vehicles (in particular shipyards), as well as furniture,
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jewelry, and toys. Most of these industries can be regarded as mature industries in which
German firms lost competitiveness since years. For acquisitions, we find comparatively
high rates of takeover activity for the industries of ore mining, rock and stone mining,
textiles, paper, metals, and again furniture, jewelry, and toys.
Table 3: Survival and exit of firms by industry
Industry (Two-digit NACE code) Survival Failure Acquisition Number of firms
Coal mining (10) 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 8
Oil and gas extraction (11) 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 17
Ore mining (13) 50.0% 0.0% 50.0% 4
Rock and stone mining (14) 50.0% 0.0% 50.0% 12
Food (15) 76.6% 1.6% 21.9% 128
Tobacco (16) 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 7
Textiles (17) 39.1% 10.9% 50.0% 46
Clothing (18) 68.8% 6.3% 25.0% 16
Leather (19) 66.7% 0.0% 33.3% 6
Wood (20) 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 5
Paper (21) 47.2% 2.8% 50.0% 36
Publishing and printing (22) 87.5% 0.0% 12.5% 16
Coal and oil processing (23) 85.7% 0.0% 14.3% 21
Chemicals (24) 84.6% 0.0% 15.4% 143
Rubber and plastic products (25) 74.2% 0.0% 25.8% 62
Rock, stone, glass (26) 61.7% 1.7% 36.7% 60
Metals (27) 59.5% 1.4% 39.2% 74
Metal products (28) 63.4% 2.8% 33.8% 71
Machinery (29) 70.7% 4.8% 24.5% 188
Machines for data processing (30) 73.7% 2.6% 23.7% 38
Machines for power generation (31) 74.0% 2.0% 24.0% 50
Machines for broadcasting 78.0% 0.0% 22.0% 50
and television (32)
Medical, optical, 74.2% 0.0% 25.8% 31
and control instruments (33)
Cars and car parts (34) 72.0% 2.0% 26.0% 50
Other vehicles (35) 69.8% 4.7% 25.6% 43
Furniture, jewelry, toys (36) 46.2% 7.7% 46.2% 13
Recycling (37) 66.7% 0.0% 33.3% 3
Construction (45) 85.1% 1.4% 13.5% 74
Trade of cars and car parts (50) 81.0% 0.0% 19.0% 21
Wholesale trade (51) 79.7% 0.5% 19.8% 207
Retail trade (52) 79.4% 0.0% 20.6% 34
Hotel and restaurant (55) 66.7% 0.0% 33.3% 9
Diversified holding companies (74) 71.7% 0.8% 27.6% 127
Average 73.1% 1.9% 25.0% 1,670
Notes: Fraction of firms by industry that survive, are acquired, or fail at a one-year horizon.
Fractions of firms add to 100 percent by industry.
These simple statistics indicate that the determinants of firm failure and acquisition
are likely to be different because industry clustering for failures is different from industry
clustering for acquisitions. This implies that any analysis of market exit of firms should
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distinguish between failure and acquisition as two different forms of market exit. Secondly,
these figures suggest that both, firm failure and acquisition, have a strong industry-specific
component. For regression analyses examining firm exit this calls for some kind of industry
adjustment, for example by including industry dummies or by correcting firm-specific
variables with the respective industry benchmark.
4.2 Performance
Table 4 shows how performance of surviving firms compares to performance of failing and
acquired firms. Mean (columns 1-3) and median (columns 4-6) statistics are calculated for
different time horizons, ranging from looking one year ahead to looking four or more years
ahead. The reason for calculating firm-specific characteristics for different time horizons
is that ex ante it is unknown whether a particular firm fails, for example, within the
next year or not, within the next two years or not, and so on. In a realistic situation,
it is typically more interesting, for example from the perspective of a banker, whether a
firm survives the next x years, or not (Astebro and Winter, 2001). Knowing when exactly
within these x years a firm fails is a more complicated problem, and presumably only of
second order to a banker. All performance measures are industry-adjusted in the sense
that they represent the difference to median performance at the two-digit industry level.1
Productivity is corrected for mean productivity in the same two-digit industry. Annual
stock market return is adjusted for performance of the DAFOX, which is the size-weighted
return of all German stocks.
We find strong support for Hypothesis F1. Table 4 shows that performance of failing
firms is significantly worse than performance of surviving firms. This result holds irre-
spective whether based on accounting measures such as return-on-assets (ROA), return-
on-equity (ROE), return-on-sales (ROS), or whether based on total factor productivity or
stock market return. Interestingly, performance of failing firms is also significantly worse
than performance of surviving firms, irrespective which time horizon is used. For exam-
ple, industry-adjusted total factor productivity of firms that fail within a time window
of the next three years (-35.2 percent) is significantly worse than productivity of firms
that survive at least three more years (-5.8 percent). The only difference between the
four time horizons is that the market-based measures, i.e. annual stock market returns
and the market-to-book ratio, for failing firms are not significantly different from those of
surviving firms with a time window of one or two years.
Similarly, Hypothesis A1 is also strongly supported. We find that acquired firms
perform significantly worse than surviving firms (Table 4). This result holds when perfor-
mance is based on accounting measures and productivity, but not when based on market
measures. In general, performance of failing firms is several times worse than performance
of acquired firms. For example, firms that fail within one year show an average industry-
adjusted ROA of -9.3 percent, but firms that are acquired an industry-adjusted ROA of
-0.5 percent. With a time horizon of four years and above, the difference in performance
between failing and acquired firms is significantly different from zero at the one-percent
level, irrespective of the performance measure chosen (not tabled).
1 We also compared accounting performance without industry-adjustment. The obtained results were
similar in quality and in relative magnitude.
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Table 4: Industry-adjusted performance as determinant of exit
Mean Median Number
Survival Failure Acquisition Survival Failure Acquisition of obs.
Return-on-assets
within 4 years + 2.1% -3.0%*** 0.6%*** 1.5% -0.8%*** 0.5%*** 3,283
within 3 years 1.4% -4.9%*** 0.2%** 1.0% -3.5%*** 0.1%*** 4,049
within 2 years 1.2% -5.2%*** -1.0%*** 0.7% -3.1%*** -0.5%*** 5,331
within 1 year 0.9% -9.3%*** -0.5%** 0.5% -4.4%*** -0.5%*** 6,515
Return-on-equity
within 4 years + 3.3% -5.5%*** 1.2%** 1.4% -1.4%*** 0.4%*** 3,283
within 3 years 2.4% -11.5%*** 1.0% 0.9% -4.6%*** -0.2%** 4,049
within 2 years 2.8% -14.7%*** -2.7%*** 0.7% -4.8%*** -1.2%*** 5,331
within 1 year 2.4% -28.7%*** -1.5%** 0.4% -6.3%*** -0.9%** 6,515
Return-on-sales
within 4 years + 5.4% -2.5%*** 2.3%*** 1.0% -0.8%*** 0.6%*** 3,137
within 3 years 4.4% -5.9%*** 1.2%*** 0.7% -1.9%*** 0.1%*** 3,869
within 2 years 4.1% -6.3%*** 1.0%*** 0.5% -1.8%*** -0.3%*** 5,111
within 1 year 3.6% -8.9%*** 2.6% 0.3% -3.1%*** -0.2%*** 6,259
Total factor productivity
within 4 years + -4.2% -36.1%*** -14.9%*** -7.1% -29.8%*** -15.3%*** 2,918
within 3 years -5.8% -35.2%*** -9.0% -8.0% -33.7%*** -13.1% 3,590
within 2 years -1.7% -42.2%*** -9.0%** -5.3% -33.9%*** -11.8%** 4,756
within 1 year 0.6% -39.2%*** -8.3%** -2.9% -34.6%*** -9.7%* 5,851
Annual stock market return
within 4 years + 1.6% -13.0%*** 2.0% 1.1% -13.2%*** 2.0% 1,343
within 3 years 0.0% -18.6%** -1.5% -0.8% -16.6%*** -0.4% 1,611
within 2 years 0.2% -29.9%*** -1.1% -0.2% -29.3%*** -0.1% 1,865
within 1 year -1.9% -23.0% -1.8% -2.1% -11.9% 0.5% 2,106
Market-to-book-ratio
within 4 years + 19.5% 6.5%*** 30.8%** 1.4% -3.9% 4.3% 1,198
within 3 years 21.7% 4.5%* 19.8% 2.0% -10.3% -1.0% 1,443
within 2 years 21.0% 60.5% 15.6% 1.3% -9.2% -1.7%* 1,670
within 1 year 19.4% 67.1% 13.5% 0.1% 0.2% 0.7% 1,891
Notes: Mean and median industry-adjusted performance of firms which survive or exit within
the next one to four or more years. The test statistics are heteroskedastic t-tests of equal means
(columns 1 vs. 2, and 1 vs. 3) and Wilcoxon rank-sum tests of equal medians (columns 4 vs. 5,
and 4 vs. 6). *, **, *** indicates significance at the 10, 5, and 1-percent levels, respectively.
Concerning the question how to measure performance, Table 4 suggests that accounting-
based returns, but also market-based returns or productivity estimates can be used to
predict firm failure. To determine the likelihood of acquisition, accounting-based and
market-based measures appear to have a different impact. The fact that market-based
measures do not seem to be related to the likelihood of acquisition could mean that
acquisitions do not occur primarily in poorly performing firms. Another interpretation
could be that capital markets anticipate the change in control, and an eventual impro-
vement in performance following the foreseeable change in control is already reflected in
the market price. Besides, since market-based measures are, of course, available only for
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listed firms, the observed relation of performance and the likelihood for acquisition might
also result from a sample selection problem. Due to these theoretical problems related
to market-based measures, a saver approach would be to examine (at least additionally)
accounting-based measures of performance. Regarding the length of the forward-looking
time horizon, the results show that the time horizon does not matter, at least when using
accounting-based measures of performance. The most consistent result over all four time
horizons is obtained when using industry-adjusted ROA.
4.3 Capital structure
Table 5 shows how the capital structure of surviving firms compares to the capital struc-
ture of failing and acquired firms. Similar to Table 4, mean (columns 1-3) and median
(columns 4-6) statistics are reported for different time horizons, ranging from looking one
year ahead to looking four or more years ahead.
Firms that fail face significantly higher financial pressure than firms that survive, ir-
respective which time horizon we choose and irrespective whether we look at interest
coverage or the debt-to-assets ratio (Table 5). For example, firms that fail within one year
have a mean debt-to-assets ratio of 61 percent, compared with a ratio of about 42 percent
for firms that survive the following year. Likewise, for failing firms median interest cover-
age is well below the value of two, a level by analysts typically regarded as an indicator
of financial distress. These results strongly support Hypothesis F2.
The picture for other measures of financial pressure is less clear. When using the quick
ratio, defined as short-term assets less inventory, normalized by short-term liabilities,
failing firms are significantly less liquid than surviving firms. Results look weaker when
using the working capital ratio, defined as short-term assets less short-term liabilities,
normalized by total assets, or when using the ratio of cash-flow-to-assets. But in general,
most measures indicate that failing firms face higher financial pressure than surviving
firms.
Analogous results are found for acquired firms. The debt-to-assets ratio is significantly
higher, and interest coverage as well as the other capital structure measures are signi-
ficantly lower compared with surviving firms. These results support Hypothesis A2.
Another interpretation could be that acquisitions are not (primarily) driven by free-cash-
flow considerations (Jensen, 1986). For the debt-to-assets ratio and interest coverage, the
difference between failing and acquired firms is significantly different from zero at the
one-percent level, but generally not for the other measures (not tabled).
Concerning the question how to measure financial pressure, Table 5 suggests that the
choice of a particular measure is likely to influence regression results much more than the
choice of a particular measure for performance. However, the direction of the expected
effect is the same across all different measures. Considering the length of the time horizon,
we find that the debt-to-assets ratio and interest coverage yield the most consistent results
across all four time horizons. Therefore and because most other measures are based on a
somewhat smaller number of observations we consider the debt-to-assets ratio and interest
coverage as the preferred measures for empirical analyses. In fact, one or both of these
measures are commonly used in the literature.
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Table 5: Capital structure as determinant of exit
Mean Median Number
Survival Failure Acquisition Survival Failure Acquisition of obs.
Debt-to-assets ratio
within 4 years + 39.2% 51.4%*** 41.9%*** 37.7% 53.4%*** 41.6%*** 3,283
within 3 years 39.8% 52.7%*** 43.5%*** 38.6% 58.0%*** 42.6%*** 4,049
within 2 years 41.2% 56.0%*** 46.2%*** 40.0% 62.7%*** 45.2%*** 5,331
within 1 year 42.3% 61.0%*** 46.2%*** 41.1% 65.3%*** 45.2%*** 6,515
Interest coverage
within 4 years + 78.4 0.7*** 124.5* 5.4 1.5*** 3.7*** 3,245
within 3 years 80.4 16.6*** 93.4 4.8 1.1*** 3.2*** 4,000
within 2 years 89.2 26.0*** 72.8 4.6 0.8*** 2.7*** 5,259
within 1 year 99.5 24.7** 71.0 4.4 0.3*** 2.6*** 6,428
Working capital ratio
within 4 years + 31.7% 27.6%** 29.1%*** 32.4% 30.6%*** 27.3%*** 3,283
within 3 years 31.1% 28.0% 28.7%** 31.6% 24.8%** 27.2% 4,049
within 2 years 30.4% 26.9% 28.2%** 30.4% 21.5% 26.7%** 5,331
within 1 year 30.0% 24.8% 28.8% 29.5% 21.2%* 27.3% 6,515
Quick ratio
within 4 years + 2.3 1.8*** 2.1* 1.8 1.3*** 1.6*** 2,587
within 3 years 2.2 1.6** 2.1 1.8 1.2*** 1.5*** 3,183
within 2 years 2.2 1.4*** 2.1* 1.7 1.1*** 1.4*** 4,121
within 1 year 2.2 1.4*** 2.1 1.6 1.1*** 1.4** 4,998
Cash-flow-to-assets
within 4 years + -8.8% -11.6% -11.2%*** -9.2% -11.6% -12.3%*** 2,955
within 3 years -9.5% -15.4%* -13.4%*** -9.8% -15.7%*** -13.4%*** 3,587
within 2 years -10.4% -14.9% -14.9%*** -10.4% -14.1% -13.7%*** 4,770
within 1 year -11.1% -17.6% -13.7%** -11.1% -14.1% -12.4%** 5,879
Notes: Mean and median values of capital structure measures, calculated for firms which survive
or exit within the next one to four or more years. The test statistics are heteroskedastic t-tests
of equal means (columns 1 vs. 2, and 1 vs. 3) and Wilcoxon rank-sum tests of equal medians
(columns 4 vs. 5, and 4 vs. 6). *, **, *** indicates significance at the 10, 5, and 1-percent levels,
respectively.
4.4 Ownership structure
Three facets of a firm’s ownership structure are analyzed in the following: concentration
of ownership, complexity of ownership, and the type of the shareholder that is in ultimate
control. First, Table 6 describes how ownership concentration differs between firms that
survive, fail, or are acquired. In analogy to the tables in Sections 4.2 and 4.3, mean
(columns 1-3) and median (columns 4-6) statistics are reported for different time horizons,
ranging from looking one year ahead to looking four or more years ahead.
Table 6 shows that ownership concentration of firms that are acquired and firms that
fail is significantly below ownership concentration of firms that survive. For example,
concentration as measured by the Herfindahl index is, on average, 51.2 percent for firms
one year before they fail, 60.4 percent for firms one year before they are acquired, but
67.6 percent for firms that survive the following year. The difference to surviving firms is
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Table 6: Ownership concentration as determinant of exit
Mean Median Number
Survival Failure Acquisition Survival Failure Acquisition of obs.
Ownership concentration (Herfindahl index)
within 4 years + 64.9% 46.2%*** 55.5%*** 73.3% 36.0%*** 56.3%*** 3.283
within 3 years 64.5% 49.9%*** 55.8%*** 70.6% 39.4%*** 56.3%*** 4,049
within 2 years 66.5% 50.8%*** 59.6%*** 81.0% 41.5%*** 59.9%*** 5,331
within 1 year 67.6% 51.2%** 60.4%*** 84.6% 46.9%*** 62.5%*** 6,515
Notes: Mean and median values of ownership concentration, calculated for firms which survive
or exit within the next one to four or more years. The test statistics are heteroskedastic t-tests
of equal means (columns 1 vs. 2, and 1 vs. 3) and Wilcoxon rank-sum tests of equal medians
(columns 4 vs. 5, and 4 vs. 6). *, **, *** indicates significance at the 10, 5, and 1-percent levels,
respectively.
highly significant, irrespective of the time horizon considered. For a time horizon of four
or more years, the difference in ownership concentration between failures and acquisitions
is also significant at the one-percent level (not tabled). Hence, the evidence supports
Hypothesis F4, but not Hypothesis A4.
Table 7 differs from Tables 4-6 because the variables used to describe the complexity of
ownership and the type of firms’ ultimate owner are dummy variables. Since in this case
median statistics can take only the values of zero or one, they would be of little help when
comparing firms by their survival status. Therefore, Table 7 reports only mean values.
These mean statistics represent the fraction of firms for a given time horizon for which
the respective ownership characteristic is true.
The first two variables in Table 7 describe pyramids and cross-ownership, two elements
of the ownership structure that can increase its complexity. We find that a significantly
smaller fraction of failing firms is part of a pyramid compared with surviving firms. For
example, 22.6 percent of firms that fail within one year are part of a pyramid structure,
compared to more than 50 percent of firms that survive at least one more year. Likewise,
failing firms are also less likely to be controlled by an owner which is part of the web of
large financial and non-financial German companies (Adams, 1994; Wenger and Kaserer,
1998). In fact, the fraction of failing firms that are cross-owned is zero. For firms that
are acquired, the fraction of firms being part of a pyramid or controlled by a cross-owned
shareholder is significantly lower than among surviving firms, but only for a time horizon
of four or more years. In sum, the results on the complexity of ownership strongly suggest
that pyramids and cross-ownership can help avert firm failure (Hypothesis F5) and, to
a weaker extent, also acquisition by another entity (Hypothesis A5).
In addition, we also collected information on the type of the ultimate owner of each firm.
There are five types of shareholders: private, financial, non-financial, government, and
dispersed. In the latter case, no single dominant shareholder is identified when applying
the concept of control as described in Appendix B. Hence, Table 7 also examines whether
firms under a specific type of ultimate owner are more likely to fail or to be acquired.
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Table 7: Ownership type as determinant of exit
Mean of group Number
Survival Failure Acquisition of obs.
Fraction of firms being part of pyramid
within 4 years + 43.7% 23.0%*** 36.7%*** 3,283
within 3 years 43.3% 29.3%** 43.6% 4,049
within 2 years 47.5% 25.9%*** 48.8% 5,331
within 1 year 50.6% 22.6%*** 50.5% 6,515
Fraction of firms controlled by cross-owned firm
within 4 years + 9.0% 0.0%*** 4.8%*** 3,283
within 3 years 8.1% 0.0%** 6.6% 4,049
within 2 years 8.1% 0.0%** 6.8% 5,331
within 1 year 8.0% 0.0%* 5.7%* 6,515
Type of ultimate owner: individuals
within 4 years + 40.3% 68.3%*** 30.3%*** 3,283
within 3 years 39.4% 64.0%*** 28.8%*** 4,049
within 2 years 36.1% 63.0%*** 28.4%*** 5,331
within 1 year 33.8% 54.8%** 25.8%*** 6,515
Type of ultimate owner: financial firm
within 4 years + 10.1% 0.0%*** 6.0%*** 3,283
within 3 years 9.2% 0.0%*** 7.8% 4,049
within 2 years 8.8% 0.0%** 7.1% 5,331
within 1 year 8.5% 3.2% 6.2%* 6,515
Type of ultimate owner: non-financial firm
within 4 years + 35.8% 17.3%*** 40.2%** 3,283
within 3 years 37.2% 16.0%*** 38.4% 4,049
within 2 years 39.8% 18.5%*** 39.3% 5,331
within 1 year 41.1% 25.8%* 40.2% 6,515
Type of ultimate owner: dispersed shares
within 4 years + 10.3% 10.8% 22.7%*** 3,283
within 3 years 11.0% 16.0% 23.7%*** 4,049
within 2 years 11.2% 14.8% 20.8%*** 5,331
within 1 year 11.5% 12.9% 21.3%*** 6,515
Type of ultimate owner: government
within 4 years + 3.5% 3.6% 0.8%*** 3,283
within 3 years 3.2% 4.0% 1.2%*** 4,049
within 2 years 4.1% 3.7% 4.3% 5,331
within 1 year 5.0% 3.2% 6.5% 6,515
Notes: Fraction of firms for which ownership characteristic is true, calculated for firms that
survive or exit within the next one to four or more years. The test statistics are calculated as
two-sided tests on the equality of proportions (columns 1 vs. 2, and 1 vs. 3). *, **, *** indicates
significance at the 10, 5, and 1-percent levels, respectively.
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Table 7 shows that the largest fraction of failing firms is controlled by a large private
shareholder. This fraction is significantly higher than the fraction of surviving firms un-
der private control. One explanation could be that private shareholders are more wealth-
constrained, and therefore firms under private control could suffer from low liquidity.
In turn, a comparatively low fraction of failing firms is controlled by a financial or a
non-financial firm. For example, 17.3 percent of firms that are ultimately owned by a
non-financial firm fail within the next four or more years. The respective fraction of firms
that survive four or more years is more than two times higher (35.8 percent). This result
is consistent with considerations on internal capital markets. For example, Lamont (1997)
shows for the US oil industry that internal capital markets are often used to transfer
cash flow between divisions. Hence, firms under control of a corporate shareholder could
be less likely to be wealth-constrained. Furthermore, we find that a significantly larger
fraction of firms with no dominant owner (dispersed) are acquired than survive. In turn, a
comparatively low fraction of firms are acquired which are under the control of a large pri-
vate owner. This finding again supports Holmstro¨m and Tirole (1993) because ownership
concentration appears to be negatively related to the likelihood of an acquisition. Finally,
there is some evidence that the likelihood to be acquired is lower than the likelihood to
survive for firms under control of a financial firm, and higher for firms under control of
a non-financial firm. This finding supports the notion that German financial firms are
cross-owned, and firms with complex ownership structures are less likely to be acquired
(Hypothesis A5).
In summary, the results presented in Tables 6 and 7 indicate that not only concentra-
tion of shares matters. Also the complexity of indirect ownership structures and the type
of the ultimate shareholder appear to be relevant for whether a firm is likely to fail or
to be acquired. For a more technical analysis of failure and acquisition in a multivariate
analysis this implies that not only ownership concentration should be included as expla-
natory variable, but also more detailed owner-specific measures such as ownership type
and ownership complexity. However, typically these owner-specific measures are not easi-
ly accessible, but must be constructed on a firm-by-firm basis. Finally, we find that the
length of the time horizon considered is not likely to have a significant impact on results.
4.5 Restructuring and firm size
As a last set of potential determinants of firm failure and acquisition we consider restruc-
turing activity and firm size. Table 8 is structured in analogy to Tables 4-6 and shows
mean (columns 1-3) and median (columns 4-6) statistics calculated for different time hori-
zons, ranging from looking one year ahead to looking four or more years ahead, separately
for firms that survive, fail, or are acquired.
Restructuring activity, if measured by the annual growth rate of employment, is more
extensive in failing firms than in surviving firms. For example, firms that fail within
one year cut employment by 11.2 percent, but firms that survive at least one more year
increase employment by 1.9 percent. Likewise, firms which are acquired show decreasing
employment. But the growth rates of employment for acquired firms and surviving firms
are significantly different only at the median, not at the mean. However, failing and
acquired firms are significantly different in terms of employment growth at the one-percent
level, both at the mean and at the median. When restructuring is measured by the fraction
of fixed assets sold per year, there is also evidence that restructuring activity is more
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Table 8: Restructuring and firm size as determinants of exit
Mean Median Number
Survival Failure Acquisition Survival Failure Acquisition of obs.
Sales of fixed assets
within 4 years + 6.4% 7.6% 6.3% 3.3% 4.1%*** 3.1% 3,065
within 3 years 6.5% 10.3%* 6.6% 3.4% 4.9%*** 3.3% 3,712
within 2 years 7.0% 10.4% 7.2% 3.5% 5.9%** 3.4% 4,902
within 1 year 7.1% 7.3% 8.1% 3.6% 6.4% 3.8% 6,015
Sales of financial assets
within 4 years + 15.5% 16.2% 13.8%* 6.7% 4.6% 4.5%*** 2,994
within 3 years 15.7% 16.7% 14.6% 6.6% 4.6% 4.4%*** 3,610
within 2 years 15.8% 17.9% 14.7% 6.3% 4.6% 4.2%*** 4,668
within 1 year 15.9% 18.3% 16.0% 6.1% 7.7% 4.2%** 5,644
Growth rate of employment
within 4 years + 4.9% -3.3%*** 3.6% 1.4% -4.1%*** 0.0%*** 2,772
within 3 years 3.7% -7.3%*** 1.9% 0.5% -6.9%*** -1.1%*** 3,400
within 2 years 2.4% -7.2%** -0.6%*** -0.1% -8.7%*** -2.2%*** 4,412
within 1 year 1.9% -11.2%*** -0.4% -0.5% -9.1%*** -2.5%*** 5,496
Total assets in million DM
within 4 years + 2,514 454.4*** 1,068.0*** 350.1 190.2*** 228.6*** 3,283
within 3 years 2,213 495.6*** 1,017.0*** 305.8 169.8*** 231.8*** 4,049
within 2 years 1,967 501.1*** 821.7*** 268.0 158.3*** 189.5*** 5,331
within 1 year 1,847 419.8*** 776.9*** 251.4 125.2** 185.7*** 6,515
Notes: Mean and median values of restructuring and firm size measures, calculated for firms
which survive or exit within the next one to four or more years. The test statistics are
heteroskedastic t-tests of equal means (columns 1 vs. 2, and 1 vs. 3) and Wilcoxon rank-sum
tests of equal medians (columns 4 vs. 5, and 4 vs. 6). *, **, *** indicates significance at the 10,
5, and 1-percent levels, respectively.
extensive in failing firms because assets are sold at a higher rate compared with surviving
firms. In contrast, sales of financial assets are, at least at the median, significantly lower
in firms that are about to experience an acquisition compared with surviving firms. In
summary, there is evidence supporting Hypothesis F3 and Hypothesis A3, and this
evidence is weaker when restructuring is measured using the sales rate of assets than when
using the growth rate of employment.
Finally, there is strong evidence in favor of Hypothesis F6 and Hypothesis A6.
Firms that survive at least one more year show average total assets of about 1,800 million
DM. This compares to total assets of about 420 million DM for firms that fail, and about
780 million DM for firms that are acquired within one year. These differences are found
across all four time horizons, and also for other measures of firm size such as total sales
and the number of employees (not tabled). Generally, the difference between failing and
acquired firms is significant at the one-percent level (not tabled). In sum, firms that are
acquired are approximately half as large as surviving firms, and firms that fail are about
half as large as acquired firms. This indicates that firm size can reduce the likelihood of
acquisition and failure.
Concerning the question how to measure firm size, we find that total assets, total sales,
or the number of employees yield similar results. Since in our data set the number of
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missing observations is the smallest for total assets, we prefer this measure of firm size.
Again, the length of the time horizon does not play a role. Regarding restructuring, our
measures yield different results, depending on the measure chosen. As Table 8 shows,
the growth rate of employment appears to be related to the likelihood of acquisition and
failure. Therefore, a measure of layoff activity looks more promising when to be used as
explanatory variable in a multivariate analysis.
4.6 Comparison of different explanatory variables
The literature review in Section 2 suggests that performance, capital structure, owner-
ship structure as well as firm size and restructuring activity are important determinants
of acquisition and failure of firms. In general, this is confirmed by the descriptive evi-
dence presented in Sections 4.2-4.5. However, the descriptive evidence also suggests that
the power of firm characteristics to explain failure and acquisition in a multivariate fra-
mework is likely to depend on the specific measure chosen. For performance, accounting
measures such as industry-adjusted ROA and industry-adjusted total factor productivity
seem to be the most helpful. For capital structure, the debt-to-assets ratio and interest
coverage look promising, and for restructuring activity and firm size, the growth rate
of employment and the natural logarithm of total assets, respectively. Finally, the evi-
dence on ownership structure suggests that not only concentration of shares is relevant.
In addition, information on the complexity of ownership, as reflected in pyramids and
cross-ownership, and information on the type of the ultimately controlling shareholder
should enter any model that attempts to explain corporate failure or acquisition.
Regarding the question which length of time horizon to consider in a multivariate ana-
lysis, the evidence suggests that regression results should not much be affected by the
choice of a particular time horizon. This is an important finding because the explanatory
power of regressions with a time horizon of one year, and hence with a larger number
of observations, will be significantly greater. For our sample, the sample with a one-year
time horizon is about twice as large as the sample with a four-year time horizon.
5 Conclusions
This study provides new stylized facts on the determinants of corporate acquisition and
failure in Germany. In that course, it has important implications for the design of empirical
studies. In particular, we identify which firm-specific characteristics are helpful to explain
corporate acquisition and failure, and which measures of these characteristics have the
highest explanatory power. We also examine to what extent the length of the forward-
looking time horizon affects the usefulness of our explanatory variables. But we do not
examine these issues in a multivariate framework. For a first application of our findings
using a more technical analysis see Heiss and Ko¨ke (2001).
The analysis is based on a sample of about 1,700 medium-sized and large German firms
for the years 1986-1995. We include listed as well as non-listed firms. Evidence based
on descriptive statistics identifies the following firm-specific characteristics as useful to
explain acquisition and failure, with suitable measures of these characteristics reported
in parentheses: performance (industry-adjusted return-on-assets and industry-adjusted
total factor productivity), capital structure (debt-to-assets ratio), ownership concentration
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(Herfindahl index), ownership complexity (cross-ownership and pyramids), restructuring
activity (growth rate of employment), and firm size (total assets). In addition, information
on the type of the ultimately controlling shareholder turns out to be important.
Our analysis yields a number of new stylized facts. First, in large and medium-sized
German firms poor performance and high financial pressure appears to make failure and
acquisition more likely. This contrasts with a view often heard in Germany that top-
performing firms would be the most likely to become takeover targets. Rather, our de-
scriptive evidence is consistent with studies on the US that takeover targets are poor
performers (Altman, 1968; Powell, 1997; Denis and Sarin, 1999; Maksimovic and Phillips,
2000). Second, compared with surviving firms, ownership is much less concentrated in
firms that fail or are acquired. For acquisitions, this is in line with Holmstro¨m and Tirole
(1993) who predict that capital markets will be able to determine the necessity of a ta-
keover only as long as concentration does not become too large. For failure, this could be
explained with large shareholders alleviating the agency problem via better monitoring
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1986). Third, firm size and cross-ownership seem to act as a kind
of takeover deterrent. Firms that are acquired are significantly smaller in size and more
likely to be under control of a cross-owned shareholder. These findings are in line with
theoretical predictions (Shleifer and Vishny, 1992; Bebchuk et al.; 1998). Similarly, larger
firms and firms that are part of pyramid structures or are controlled by a cross-owned
shareholder are also less likely to fail. Fourth, firms that are about to fail or to be acquired
show significantly higher restructuring activity, measured as employee layoffs, compared
with surviving firms.
This study has important implications for the design of empirical studies explaining
corporate failure or acquisition. First, failure and acquisition typically are the two main
reasons for sample attrition in empirical studies, and they appear to be influenced by
common factors. Hence, they should be examined in combination. Models explaining fai-
lure but not taking into account the second form of sample exit, acquisition (see, e.g.,
Harhoff et al., 1998; Almus, 2000), or vice versa, are likely to suffer from a sample selecti-
on problem. This could bias estimation results (Bo¨rsch-Supan and Ko¨ke, 2000). Second,
we find that the industry distribution is significantly different for failure and acquisitions.
This calls for some kind of industry adjustment in the empirical analysis, for example by
including industry dummies or by correcting some variables for their industry benchmark.
Third, a range of firm-specific characteristics is helpful to explain failure and acquisiti-
on. Analyses leaving out some of these measures are potentially subject to the classical
omitted variables problem. Fourth, care should be taken when selecting specific measures
for these firm characteristics because some measures perform much better than others in
the analysis of firm exit. Finally, the good news is that the length of the forward-looking
time horizon essentially does not seem to matter for the usefulness of our measures. This
implies that regression models using shorter lags should capture the main effects.
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A Data sources and sample selection
The starting point of data selection is Hoppenstedt’s Balance Sheet Database (BSD)
which contains information on a significant number of large listed and non-listed firms,
both in the legal form of AG and GmbH. We take 1986 as the starting year because a
change in disclosure rules hinders comparability of the annual reports before and after
the year 1986.2 The last year of our investigation is 1996 because our series of ownership
data ends in this year. For the period 1986-1996, BSD contains 5,679 firms (31,294 firm-
years) for which consolidated balance sheet data are available. We eliminate firms from the
utility, traffic, and telecommunications industries because they were still predominantly
government-owned during the period of observation. As a matter of comparability, we
also eliminate firms which primarily operate in the banking and insurance business, while
operating little in non-financial activities. In combination, selection by industry causes
1,928 firm deletions.
Data on ownership structures are obtained from annual reports published by former
Hypobank. These reports contain ownership information on all listed German companies,
but also on a range of large non-listed firms. Hypobank reports the size and the name
of a direct owner when the size of the ownership block exceeds five percent. In very few
cases smaller ownership blocks are also included. However, ownership information from
Hypobank cannot readily be used in our analysis for three reasons. First, ownership infor-
mation from Hypobank only refers to the direct level of owners. But this analysis requires
to identify the ultimate owner of each sample firm. Second, Hypobank does not directly
reveal ownership information on medium-sized non-listed firms. Other commercial data
sources are also of little help because during our period of observation, non-listed firms
generally have not been subject to strictly enforced disclosure requirements. Therefore, we
construct the relevant ownership structures by searching the information on investments
in subsidiaries and affiliated companies which is given in the appendix to each company
in Hypobank. In addition, we searched the Mannheim Company Database (MUP) located
at the ZEW in Mannheim. Thereby we obtain ownership structures on many medium-
sized non-listed firms, mainly in the legal form of private companies with limited liability
(GmbH). Third, we tracked all sample firms through the years 1986-1996 to obtain a panel
on ownership structures, merging firm-years on the basis of the name of each company.
A problem was that some firms in our sample changed their names during the period
of observation, for example following takeovers or restructuring of conglomerates. Since
changes in ownership are crucial to the data collection procedure, we searched Hypobank
and MUP for information on changes in names as well as takeovers.
In sum, we drop firms with less than two consecutive years for which ownership informa-
tion is available because our analysis requires to calculate changes in ownership (2,216 firm
deletions). And 71 firms must be eliminated due to missing values on the variables used
for the empirical analysis. This selection procedure leaves 1,464 firms (6,541 firm-years)
for the years 1986-1996. Table 9 summarizes the selection procedure.
To construct the final sample required for the analysis of firm survival, failure, and
acquisition, we proceed in three steps. First, we examine all firms (241 firms) for which
balance sheet data end before 1996, the final year of the sample, because these represent
2 In 1985 several changes were introduced in German corporate law (§289HGB), most of them triggered
by the European Community’s Fourth Company Law Directive on the harmonization of national
requirements pertaining to financial statements.
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Table 9: Data selection procedure
Selection criterion Firms Firm-years
Consolidated balance sheet data for the years 1986-1996 5,679 31,294
Mining, manufacturing, construction, and trade 3,751 20,614
Two consecutive years of ownership data 1,535 9,000
No missing values 1,464 6,541
Splitting of time series in case of acquisition 1,676 6,541
Two forms of market exit: acquisition and bankruptcy 1,670 6,515
potential firm exits. In particular, we check the consistency of information on the reason
for exit provided in BSD and MUP databases. In addition, all relevant firms have been
contacted by telephone.
In a second step, firm’s ownership structures are examined to identify changes in control.
If the name of the ultimate owner changes, this is interpreted as an acquisition.3 Hence, a
firm as reported in BSD could experience several exits during the sample period. However,
this does not occur often. For 1,1103 firms (75.3 percent), ultimate ownership remains
constant during the full sample period. For 309 firms (21.1 percent), the ultimate owner
changes once, for 45 firms (3.1 percent) twice, and for 7 firms (0.5 percent) three times.
Summarizing, firm exit can occur in two forms: (1) failure or acquisition, reflected in
an interrupted balance sheet data time series as provided by BSD, and (2) acquisition,
reflected in an ongoing balance sheet data time series but a change in ultimate ownership.
Applying this definition of exit to our sample, the number of 1,464 firms increases to 1,676
firms. The number of observations (6,541 firm-years), of course, remains constant.
In a final step, we eliminate six firms (26 firm-years) that shut down operations but
did not declare bankruptcy because the determinants of voluntary and forced exit are
eventually different. If this is true, our findings on the determinants of forced exit will
(statistically) be more difficult to identify. This leaves a final sample of 1,670 firms (6,515
firm-years). We refer to this as the full sample in the empirical analysis in Section 4.
It includes only firm-years for which we know whether the particular firm is acquired,
declares bankruptcy, or survives in the year ahead. In this case, the time horizon is one
year. The full sample excludes all firm-years for which the survival status one year ahead
is unknown and firm-years in which an acquisition takes place. In addition, three sub-
samples are used in the empirical analysis with time horizons of two (5,331 firm-years),
three (4,049 firm-years), and four or more years (3,283 firm-years). Since this requires a
spell length of at least two, three, or four and more years, the number of observations is
lower the longer the time horizon is (see also Section 3).
B Concept of control
Large German companies typically show complex ownership structures such as pyramids
with several layers of ownership and cross-ownership between firms (La Porta et al., 1999;
3 Appendix B provides a technical description of the concept of control applied in this study (see also
Ko¨ke, 2000).
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Bo¨hmer, 2000; Ko¨ke, 2001). Hence, analysis of direct ownership is not sufficient. It is im-
portant to determine which shareholder ultimately controls a firm (ultimate ownership).
This requires considering the ownership structure of direct shareholders as well as a cri-
terion that establishes whether a shareholder is controlled by another shareholder, i.e.
whether to extend the analysis to the next level in the ownership structure. In essence,
for each shareholder in any control chain it needs to be established whether there is a
controlling owner or not.
The ultimate owner is identified for each firm in two steps. First, we identify the ultimate
owner of each direct shareholder using the following rules: Starting from the direct level
(level 1), we proceed to the next level (level 2) in the ownership structure if the largest
shareholder on level 2 owns 50 percent or more of the shares. If this criterion is not
met, the largest shareholder must own 25 percent or more of the shares, with all other
shareholders owning less than 25 percent. In case where both criteria are not met, our
stop rule applies and we do not pursue the respective ownership chain further. These rules
guarantee that no more than one ultimate owner is identified for each direct shareholder.
Note that if a shareholder has split his ownership stake in a particular company into
several smaller stakes, for example into two blocks of 50 percent held by two subsidiary
firms, we combine these smaller stakes into one single block. We set the first cut-off point
at 50 percent because German law allows an investor owning 50 percent or more of all
company shares to appoint management.4 The second cut-off point is set at 25 percent
because an investor owning 25 percent of the shares in a company has the right to veto
decisions. In a second step in determining the ultimate owner, we apply both rules to all
direct shareholders. This allows us to identify one single shareholder that is in ultimate
control of each sample firm. When no single shareholder fulfills the criteria of our concept
of control, this company is seen to have no ultimate owner.
4 A 50 percent majority is sufficient to dismiss management after their regular period of office. But a
majority of 75 percent is required to dismiss management during its period of office (§103(1)AktG).
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C Definition of variables
Table 10: Definition of variables
Performance:
Total factor productivity Residual from OLS estimation of Cobb-Douglas
production function, y = αk + βl, with y=ln(total sales),
k=ln(replacement costs of tangible assets) and
l=ln(total number of employees). Sales and capital stock
are deflated using appropriate price indices.
Return-on-assets (ROA) Earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) divided by total assets
Return-on-equity (ROE) EBIT divided by total equity
Return-on-sales (ROS) EBIT divided by total sales
Market-to-book ratio Market value of equity divided by book value of equity




n ∗ 52 with continuous
weekly return Rcw = ln(
Kpw
Kpw−1
) with Kpw performance value on
Wednesday of week w. Kpw is corrected for capital changes,
changes of stock’s face value, stock splits, and dividend payments.
Ownership structure:
Herfindahl index H =
∑n
j=1 Pj , with Pj size of individual block
Control Control = 1 if firm has ultimately controlling shareholder,
calculated based on concept of control, zero otherwise
Pyramid Pyramid = 1 if ultimately controlling shareholder is located on
the second or higher level in the ownership structure,
zero otherwise
Cross-ownership Cross = 1 if ultimate owner is part of the web of firms
identified by Wenger and Kaserer (1997) and if ultimate owner
indirectly owns share block in itself, zero otherwise
Capital structure:
Debt-to-assets ratio Total debt to total assets
Interest coverage EBIT divided by interest payments
Working capital ratio Short-term assets less short-term liabilities
divided by total assets
Quick ratio Short-term assets less short-term liabilities less inventory
divided by total assets
Cash-flow-to-assets (EBIT+depreciation+taxes) divided by total assets
Restructuring:
Sales of assets sjt =
Sjt
Tjt
with Sjt sales of asset class j in year t and
Tjt stock of asset class j at the beginning of year t
Growth rate of nt =
Nt−Nt−1
Nt−1 with Nt total number of employees in year t
employment
